Response

Human rights are part of the everyday language in Palestine; they're part of basically every aspect of life and society. After reading Allen's book, it seems to me that everyone in Palestine is thinking or talking about human rights, in one way or another. The language of human rights is also the language used when the international community talks about Palestine. Those who do human rights work have become "professionalized", and the focus these days is not on getting actual work done or producing results, but rather, on securing funds from donors. Human rights works, generally, are better off financially than the average Palestinian because they are able to pay themselves large salaries from the donations sent to their HROs. This is one of the reasons many, if not most, Palestinians are cynical about human rights work. They see it not as something which can benefit them, but rather, as a way for others to profit while pretending to work for them.

The first HRO, Al-Haq, focused on being logical and methodical. At the time of its inception, in 1979, the language of human rights didn't really exist yet, and human rights activism was not as widespread or well-known as it is now. The members of Al-Haq focused heavily on objectivity; their goal was to combat the colonialist (Israeli?) image of them as "irrational." They worked to produce what Allen calls "disinterested knowledge" and relied on the "statistical and legalistic idioms of law and human rights." At this point, Israel was both credible and sympathetic, so Al-Haq, and Palestinians in general, had to struggle to be both taken seriously and sympathetic against Israel. This led to the emergence of nationalist values and a "nationalist activist" which allowed their human rights work to succeed. Al-Haq focused on international law as well, attempting to prove Israel's occupation was illegal. They demanded an apoliticism from their members, which was both an attempt to keep the group from splintering as well as a concern for international opinion. They believed a "clarity and precision of detail" would weaken Israel's "domination of the historical and political narrative." They weren't fighting just to secure rights for Palestinians, but also, to secure a place for Palestinians to be heard and taken seriously. They were the colonized trying to fight a colonialist narrative while the colonizers were still there and still securely in power.

The first intifada solidified the place of human rights and human rights organizations in Palestinians politics. The "crackdown" against Palestine, the abuses suffered by Palestinians, were seen by the international media, which coupled with reports from Al-Haq and other HROs, drew attention to the Palestinians' cause. The HRO "politicized law" through their repeated use of legal language to protest the occupation, and they formally entrenched human rights language. These events helped create the human rights framework that exists today. They focused not on Palestinians as victims, but rather, as empowered people.

NGO funding, according to Allen, can be described as a form of "soft colonialism"; it is linked to the political goals of the foreign donors. The NGO work is done in a "moral economy", a "system of social norms, values, and judgments" about appropriate economic and social relations. In Paletstine this is tied to both a political economy and national history. Debating about where donor funds go is really debating about the nature of the Palestinian nation. The Oslo era prompted widespread disturst of NGOs/HROs and donors that led to the creation of ethical guidelines and conduct rules. The view of the Palestinian Authority as not being on the path to becoming an actual sovereign state, but rather, merely a tool of the occupation, a security force created to keep Palestinians quiet and protect Israel's interests is another reason both the PA and these organizations are distrusted. The professionalization of HR work has led to it being depoliticized and desocialized. It's very similar to some of what Duggan discussed. Without neo-liberalism, none of this could really exist the way it does. The point of HROs has been lost in the fight to get money, and the requirements to receive funding keep them even more from making any actual progress. At the same time, it also keeps these groups/people focused on the wrong things.

Human rights education is not just about teaching Palestinians about their rights or empowering them, as it once was, but rather about shaping the Palestinian state. It tries to shape the political subjects the various groups behind this education think are appropriate. Its a way to control not only what gets done, but also what gets discussed, what gets deemed "important" by the "state", for lack of a better term. It works to shape the idea of the "citizen" as well as "security." Security forces are seen as, or see themselves, as almost the state itself. They are the "most important reflection" of the state. "Citizens" are rebellious and in need to policing, which in turn produces even more distrust and cynicism on the part of ordinary citizens. At the same time, HR education is also used to teach citizens about their rights and about democracy; it's a way/place to criticize the PA. This seems like it cannot work. How can the same thing be used to create an apparatus of the state that regulates the citizens and creates a better image of the state also be used to promote criticism of said state? The PA isn't an actual state, and it hasn't really solidified an image of itself as a state, so maybe this work to police the citizenry is a necessary part of trying to do that, though how can it ever be truly done if Palestine continues to be occupied?

Hamas is an alternative to the PA and the NGO system. They draw on nationalism and the nostalgia for the early days of HR work in Palestine. They show an image of a group acting for the people, an image that is free from cynicism. They are an Islamist group and use Islam as a "frame of reference"  for their work but claim the establishment of an Islamic state is not their ultimate goal. Their claims about human rights do no differ significantly from established notions about human rights. The real debate is about whether Islam can be in accordance with universal human rights standards, and I think that is where Mohanty comes in. Can the international community make such a judgment? Are some practices so obviously a violation of human rights that the international community and/or The West can make that judgment call, or is it more complicated than that? Particularly in regard to women, who gets to say when/if they are oppressed? I think Mohanty would, and is, arguing it is up to them to say.

In "Under Western Eyes Revisited" she not only discusses some of the misreadings of the original essay, but also, the ways it would be different were it to be written now (or, really in 2004.) I found the parts about globalization and global capital particularly interesting. She calls for the making of gender and power visible in the process of global restructuring, and in some ways, isn't that what we've been working on this semester? She  points out the increased attention from feminists on the hegemonic masculinities that are being produced, but also asks, what are the femininities being produced from these processes? These stand-ins for real women that she discusses sound like what we've been discussing. Rather than accepting the images that are produced, we've been unpacking them to see the real people.