One of the themes apparent in Lisa Marie Cacho’s Social Death is that of reduction. Cacho
adequately illustrates that criminalized bodies are treated as always already
criminal, thus rendering them inevitable
of and already guilty of law-breaking
(4). Because these bodies are simultaneously racialized, they are regarded as
“just another thug/gang member/criminal/etc.” This reductionist language
further removes personhood and the right to have rights from these
criminalized, racialized bodies. Cacho writes “Journalists rarely represent
gang members and drive-by shooters as complex people, let alone as victims of
law or as teenagers and young adults who make mistakes” (59). This lack of
addressing complexity is significant not only because it further proves Cacho’s
point, but also because when looking at other bodies in the news media – those
that are not racialized and not criminalized --
there seems to almost always be a trend of expansion. For example, the
typical white male school shooter is never referred to a “just another
shooter/psycho.” Instead, there is extensive coverage of his past, his family,
his personal relationships, his morals, his interests, his hobbies, how he
spent his free time…the list goes on. Inherent in this effort to find the root
of his deviant behavior is the assumption that he was not supposed to end up
this way and furthermore, that this behavior is not “natural.” The failure to expand
upon the potential causes for racialized and criminalized bodies signifies
first, that the behavior is “typical” and is not in need of digging further,
and second, that an exploration into the social problems and issues that
contributed to such behavior is not necessary and/or relevant. In this manner,
criminal behavior falls under the umbrella of essentialism for certain types of
bodies, and thus, they are guilty of the crime of being, or as Cacho refers to
it: de facto status crimes (43).
Although
there are probably many who would refute Cacho’s claims, her theoretical
arguments are sound and can be seen in the media on a daily basis. For example,
there was a news story about a white youth not too long ago who drove
intoxicated, even causing a death. The court ruled that he was not fit for
jail, and he was put on house arrest instead (a Google search of this is coming
up blank, but it happened!). This is quite the opposite of the situation
involving Cacho’s cousin Brandon, who was not only portrayed as undeserving of
sympathy in death, but also completely responsible for the death of himself and
his friends. The term Cacho would use to differentiate between these scenarios
would be the intelligibility of the crime; for the white youth, his crime of
drunk driving was seen more as an anomaly or a one-time mistake (unintelligible
for his white body), whereas Brandon’s crime was seen as “making sense” and/or
inevitable (intelligible for his body of color). Another example that comes to
mind is the situation that occurred after the passing of the anti-immigration
law in Alabama:
Then, in a widely publicized, awkward incident in November
of 2011, cops in Alabama stopped a Mercedes Benz executive driving a rental car
and were forced, under the new law’s provisions, to arrest him when he couldn’t
produce acceptable ID. The executive was driving near Tuscaloosa, where
Mercedes Benz has a manufacturing plant — Alabama, like many Southern states,
has bent over backward in recent decades to attract foreign automakers by
giving them generous tax breaks and other incentives.
(Source: http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/alabamas-draconian-anti-immigrant-law-dies-with-a-whimper)
Because the law’s intent was to encourage self-deportation,
the aforementioned was not seen as a potential outcome. According to Cacho:
“…illegality, like criminality, is also unrecognizable in popular discourse
without a body of color” (101). I wonder how the story would have played out
differently had the executive been a man (or woman) of color from the Middle
East or Latin America.
The end of
Cacho’s book left me with many questions regarding both current events and the
state of feminism. I would like to learn more about the racialization of the
riots and protests in Ferguson due to the death of Mike Brown, especially after
the recent comparison to the ridiculous situation involving white people in New
Hampshire and pumpkins (http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/21/living/keene-pumpkinfest-riot-ferguson/).
My next question is about the reflexivity and personal aspects of critical
feminist theory. More specifically, is there a way for critical feminist theory
to be less personal or less reflexive and if so, is it necessary? Or, is the
reflexive and personal nature of critical feminist theory what makes it so
unique and important? I keep returning to this question because some of our
more recent readings have a very self-reflective lens to them: Downtown Ladies, Adopted Territories, and
now Social Death with the telling of
Brandon’s story. One of the most offensive things I learned in my feminist
pedagogy class is that Women’s Studies in general is critiqued for easily
morphing into “group therapy sessions.” Although I was upset by this, I could
see how others’ misinterpretation of the discipline could be framed that way.
How many times in class do we tell personal stories, and isn’t it necessary to
do this in order to “theorize from the the flesh?” I believe it is, and I do
not mean to question the validity of Women’s Studies in any way or suggest that
personal experience is irrelevant. Furthermore, I do not wish to portray that
we should not theorize from the flesh because it is too messy or sticky. However,
what I do wish to question is how big or small of a piece it should be when it
comes to writing feminist scholarship.
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